Acme Corp Cloudflare Cloud Workload Security demo

Demo library › Chapter 1

Stop data exfiltration through cloud APIs

ReadyExfiltration test~6 minCloud Workload SecurityRego metadataData perimeter

Five writes of "company secrets" to an attacker's S3, SQS, SNS, Kinesis and DynamoDB. Straight to AWS they all land; through Cloud Workload Security every one is blocked, and the company's own bucket still works.

The problem

Every cloud data-loss control people know about protects the company's own account: bucket policies, SCPs, IAM. None of them help when an insider or a compromised workload uses its own, perfectly valid credentials to write data into someone else's account. The attacker's IAM is happy to accept it, nothing the company owns ever changes, and the network sees TLS to amazonaws.com - exactly like every legitimate call.

This is the test Kivera built to make that point at demo.kivera.io, rebuilt for Cloudflare: one click, five services, a result in five seconds.

Lands with: CISOs and security architects - anyone who has asked how data could leave through the cloud

Before you start

Run it

The risk

DoSay
On the exfiltration test, choose Straight to AWS and click Run a 5 second test now.This is a workload with valid AWS credentials. It's going to push a record of customer data to five services in an account the attacker controls.
Point at the verdict and the five red rows.Five of five. S3, SQS, SNS, Kinesis, DynamoDB - every one accepted. Nothing in the company's own account changed, so nothing there would ever alert.
Scroll to What reached the attacker's account.And there is the data, sitting in the attacker's resources.
Whybackground, if you are asked

The writes go to the AWS Emulator using the real AWS hostnames - s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com and so on - so the requests are exactly what a workload would send to AWS. The lab explains how. The attacker's resources live in the same emulator, which is the one simplification: in real life they would be in a different AWS account, and that makes the point stronger, not weaker.

The same five requests, through Cloudflare

DoSay
Click Run it through Cloudflare CWS →.Same workload, same credentials, same five requests. The only change is the route: every API call now goes through the Cloud Workload Security proxy.
Point at the five green rows.Five of five blocked, before the request reached AWS. And look at the line underneath.
Read the Business as usual line.Writing to the company's own bucket still works. This isn't blocking S3 - it's blocking S3 to places we don't own.
Open Result breakdown → S3 Bucket.The exact request - a PUT to the attacker's bucket - and Cloudflare's response. AWS never saw it.
Whybackground, if you are asked

The test runs server-side in the lab, not in your browser as Kivera's did, so the route can be switched with one click. The SDK calls are the AWS SDK for JavaScript's own, unmodified; only the HTTPS agent changes.

How it decided

DoSay
In the dashboard, open Cloud Workload Security → Policies → aws-data-perimeter.One policy. The filter selects AWS traffic; the Rego says a write is valid only if every destination it names is on the approved list.
Open Rego metadata ↗ → data-perimeter.And the list is data, here. Approving a new company bucket is an edit to this document, not a change to the policy.
Whybackground, if you are asked

The policy has to find the destination in four different AWS protocols: the bucket in the S3 path, QueueUrl and TopicArn in SQS and SNS, StreamName for Kinesis, TableName and RequestItems for DynamoDB. The cws-lab-helpers Rego module does that once, so the policy itself is four lines. Both are on the Policies page.

What the audience should see

Where the evidence is

The exfiltration test's Proxy decisions page: every request the proxy evaluated, the identity it came from (workstation) and the decision. On the VM, sudo cws-lab decisions.

Known limitations

The attacker's resources share the emulator's single account with the company's, so this perimeter is drawn by resource name. In a real estate the same policy would usually test the destination account instead - input.application.aws.account_id, or a tenant structure describing your AWS organisation.

The emulator does not deliver SNS messages to subscribers, so the SNS card counts the publishes the attacker's topic accepted.

Change the perimeter as data - approve a bucket live and watch one row turn red. Enforce or monitor - the same test with enforcement off.

Part of: Cloud Workload Security in 20 minutes · The data perimeter