Demo library › Chapter 7
Different guardrails for pipelines and people
Every client of the proxy has its own Basic Auth identity. Workloads select requests by identity, so the same request can be allowed for a platform engineer's break-glass shell and blocked for every pipeline.
The problem
A pipeline, an engineer's terminal and an application are not the same risk. One guardrail for all of them is either too loose for the pipelines or too tight for the people who fix things at 3am.
Lands with: platform teams with more than one kind of workload - and anyone asking "what about break-glass?"
Before you start
- An SSH session to the lab's Ubuntu VM.
- Basic Auth credentials ↗ and Workloads ↗ open in the dashboard.
Run it
Every client has an identity
| Do | Say |
|---|---|
| Open Basic Auth credentials. | Two identities: ci-pipeline, used by every CI job, and workstation, used by the exfiltration test and by a shell on this VM. Each has its own password; the proxy knows who is calling. |
| Open Workloads. | Workloads select requests. Two by destination - AWS, Cloudflare - and two by identity: CI/CD pipelines and Developer workstations. |
The same request, two identities
| Do | Say |
|---|---|
On the VM, run sudo cws-lab shell. In it, run aws s3api delete-public-access-block --bucket acme-website-assets. | This shell goes through CWS as workstation. Removing the public access block is refused - same as from the pipeline. |
| In the dashboard, open Policy sets → AWS guardrails and add Developer workstations under Exclude workload. Save. | Now the policy: configuration guardrails apply to everything except the workstation identity - think of it as the platform team's break-glass. The data perimeter set is untouched, so even break-glass cannot exfiltrate. |
| Wait 30 seconds and run the same command again in the shell. | Allowed, for this identity. Push a change that does the same thing from the pipeline, and it's still blocked. |
| Remove the exclusion and save. | And break-glass is closed again. |
Whybackground, if you are asked
Exclusions take precedence over inclusions in a policy set. A workload match never bypasses a policy's own filter, and other policy sets still apply - which is why the data perimeter still holds for the excluded identity.
Unknown clients
| Do | Say |
|---|---|
Leave the shell. On the VM, run docker run --rm --network cwslab curlimages/curl -sv -x http://cws-proxy:8080 https://sts.amazonaws.com/ 2>&1 | grep -E "^< HTTP|407". | A client with no credentials at all. The proxy doesn't serve it. |
What the audience should see
- DeletePublicAccessBlock refused, allowed once the workstation identity is excluded, and refused again afterwards.
- An unauthenticated client turned away by the proxy.
Where the evidence is
Proxy decisions: the identity column shows workstation for the shell and ci-pipeline for the pipeline.
Known limitations
The last step assumes the proxy requires Basic Auth once credentials are attached to the deployment, which is how the lab is configured. If it answers with something other than 407, show the identity column in the decisions instead.
Part of: Guardrails for every pipeline